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Abstract
Technological change was unskilled-labor-biased during the early Industrial Revolu-
tion of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but is skill-biased today.
This fact is not embedded in extant uniﬁed growth models. We develop a model of
the transition to sustained economic growth which can endogenously account for both
these facts, by allowing the factor bias of technological innovations to reﬂect the proﬁt-
maximising decisions of innovators. Endowments dictated that the initial stages of the
Industrial Revolution be unskilled-labor biased. The transition to skill-biased techno-
logical change was due to a growth in “Baconian knowledge” and international trade.
Simulations show that the model does a good job of tracking reality, at least until the
mass education reforms of the late nineteenth century.
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lor@ucdavis.edu)On March 11th, 1811, several hundred framework knitters gathered in the Nottingham mar-
ketplace, not far from Sherwood Forest, to protest their working conditions. Having been
dispersed by the constabulary and a troop of Dragoons, they reassembled that evening in
nearby Arnold, and broke some sixty stocking frames. On November 10th of the same year
another Arnold mob gathered in Bulwell forest, under the command of someone styling him-
self “Ned Lud,” and the rapidly growing Luddite movement would suﬀer its ﬁrst fatality
that night when John Westley was shot dead during an attack on the premises of Edward
Hollingsworth, a local hosier.
Two more died during the course of the famous attack on William Cartwright’s Rawfolds
Mill in Yorkshire, on the night of April 11th, 1812. Cartwright had been expecting trouble,
and was sleeping above his mill together with some armed guards, but the attackers might
have succeeded in their plans had a watch dog not woken the garrison with his barking.
As it was, the mill’s nine defenders opened ﬁre on some 150 men, and were able to drive
them oﬀ before the mob succeeded in gaining access to the heavily fortiﬁed building. The
following January, at the York Assizes, seventeen men were hanged for their part in these
and related disturbances (Darvall 1969, Thomis 1970). “Machine breaking” was eventually
made a capital crime, a move opposed only by a few critics, such as Lord Byron.
Byron’s support for the Luddites may not seem surprising given the view of technology
implicit in the novel which his good friend, Mary Shelley, was writing at the time, namely
Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus (Pynchon 1984). Today, the term Luddite often
refers to opponents of technological progress for its own sake. At the time, however, Captain
Ludd’s followers were engaged in what Hobsbawm (1952, p. 59) has termed “collective
bargaining by riot.” “In none of these cases...was there any question of hostility to machines
as such. Wrecking was simply a technique of trade unionism” (ibid.) on the part of skilled
textile workers who were ﬁnding their living standards being eroded by new machinery.
This new machinery was making it possible for employers not just to produce cloth more
eﬃciently, but to use cheaper unskilled workers, women, and even children, in the place
of highly paid artisans. Technological change during the early Industrial Revolution hurt
skilled workers, and skill premia fell during this period, as we shall see. Not surprisingly,
skilled workers objected to this.
In the late twentieth century, there were still concerns that technological change was
hurting workers, but by then the identity of the victims had utterly changed. From the
1970s onwards, there was a dramatic increase in skill premia in countries such as the United
States, where real wages of workers with less than 12 years of education fell by 20.2 log
points between 1979 and 1995. Over the same period, real wages of workers with 12 years
of education fell 13.4 log points; real wages of workers with 16 or more years of education
rose 3.5 log points; and real wages of workers with 18+ years of education rose 14 log points
(Katz and Autor 1999, Table 2, p. 1476). In the “race” between education and technology—
notwithstanding impressive long-run increases in the supply of skills—labor demand trends
show that skill-biased technological change has replaced the earlier unskilled-bias, after a
“turning point” sometime in the late nineteenth century (Goldin and Katz 2007, chap. 3).
1Why is it that nineteenth century technological progress hurt skilled workers, while twen-
tieth century technological progress hurt the unskilled? The aim of this paper is to show
that these two episodes, which seem on the face of it to be contradictory, can be understood
within a single analytical framework, and were part of the same broad historical process. In
doing so, the paper places itself within a recent “uniﬁed growth literature” (e.g., Galor and
Weil 2000; Jones 2001; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Lucas 2002), which aims to show that
such apparently disparate phenomena as the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, and the European fertility transition of the late nineteenth
century, were in fact causally related to each other.
We will follow the lead of this literature, and relate the economic fortunes of both Luddites
and today’s unskilled workers, not just to technological change, but to two phenomena that
demand explanation and have been stressed in the recent theoretical literature. The ﬁrst is
the aforementioned fertility transition, which saw the number of births per woman decline
dramatically beginning (in Britain) some time around the 1890s (Clark 2007). The second
is the increase in education, as measured by literacy. As Clark (2005) emphasizes, English
literacy rates were slowly increasing from the late sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries;
after a temporary eighteenth century plateau, men’s literacy resumed its slow rise in the early
nineteenth century, but it accelerated only after 1860 or so. (Women’s literacy improved more
or less continuously from the mid-seventeenth century to the early twentieth century; but
here again there was a noticeable acceleration after 1850 or so).
In order to accomplish these goals, we need to move beyond existing uniﬁed growth
models, such as the benchmark model provided by Galor and Weil (2000), in several respects.
Most obviously, we need to incorporate two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, so that
we can track their relative earnings over time. Second, we need to allow for factor-biased
technological change. Third, and most importantly, we need to allow for the direction of
factor bias to diﬀer at diﬀerent points in time. Since we want to explain why technological
change was so diﬀerent in nature during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rather
than assume that this was the case, we are going to have to explicitly model the choices
facing would-be innovators. If the direction of technological change diﬀered over time, this
presumably reﬂected the diﬀerent incentives facing these inventors.
In this paper, we thus delve into the microeconomics of technological change to a greater
extent than previous “uniﬁed growth theory” papers, which have tended to model technolog-
ical change in a reduced form manner as a function of scale eﬀects (cf. Romer 1990; Kremer
1993) and/or human capital endowments. Among the few models in this literature that do
not neglect the skill premium, most have it rise monotonically or else remain constant (Voth
2003; Clark 2004, 2005). By contrast, we propose a fully-speciﬁed research and development
model driving technological change, which is appropriate for this period since Allen (2006)
has recently pointed out that British ﬁrms were investing signiﬁcant resources in the search
for technical breakthroughs during the Industrial Revolution. Building on the foundations of
the benchmark Galor-Weil (2000) and Galor-Mountford (2004) models, we thus make several
key changes to previous speciﬁcations.
2The ﬁrst key feature of our approach is that we disentangle two distinct elements of
technological progress: basic knowledge (B) and applied knowledge (A). In our model, the
former grows according to the level of human capital in the economy and is a public good;
the latter describes ﬁrms’ techniques, which are subject (for a time) to private property
rights, generate private proﬁts, and hence create incentives for research. In our model, A
is driven by research which generates beneﬁts (increases in A) but also has costs (that are
decreasing in B); thus basic knowledge drives the development of applied knowledge.
This distinction between basic and applied knowledge is inspired by Mokyr (2002; 2005a),
who distinguishes between two knowledge types: the “propositional” episteme (“what”) and
the “prescriptive” techne (“how”). He terms these Ω-knowledge and λ-knowledge. An
addition to the Ω set is for Mokyr a discovery and an addition to the λ set is an invention.
Mokyr’s categories can be thought of as close parallels to our B-knowlege (what we might
term “Baconian” knowledge) and A-knowledge (the usual notion of total factor productivity,
or TFP). We propose the term Baconian knowledge to honor Francis Bacon, whose principles
guided the rise of a pragmatic, post-Enlightenment approach to applied “basic” science that
would ultimately generate “applied” material beneﬁt. If Mokyr’s (2002, 41) characterization
is accurate, then this honor is rightfully bestowed on Bacon since “the amazing fact remains
that by and large the economic history of the Western world was dominated by materializing
his ideals.” Our model can provide a rationale for one of Mokyr’s key claims, namely that
“the true key to the timing of the Industrial Revolution has to be sought in the scientiﬁc
revolution of the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth
century” (p. 29). As will be seen, basic knowledge in our R & D model has to advance for
some time before applied knowledge starts to improve. This helps our model match reality:
we ﬁnd that Baconian knowledge B can increase continuously but applied knowledge or
productivity A only starts to rise in a discontinuous manner once B passes some threshold.
The second key feature of our model, and the paper’s main contribution, is that it
endogenizes the direction of technological change. There are two ways to produce output,
using either a low-skill technique (based on raw labor L) or a high-skill technique (based on
educated labor, or human capital H ). For simplicity, these techniques are each linear in their
sole input, and have their own applied knowledge, summarized in endogenous productivity
coeﬀcients, or technology levels.
Research by ﬁrms, which is patentable or otherwise excludable in the short run, can raise
these technology levels and generate short-run monopoly proﬁts. In the spirit of Acemoglu
(1998), we allow potential innovators to look at the supply of skilled and unskilled labor
in the workforce, and tailor their research eﬀorts accordingly. The direction as well as the
pace of technological change thus depends on demography. At the same time, demography
is explicitly modeled as depending on technology, as is common in the literature (e.g. Galor
and Weil 2000). Households decide the quality and quantity of their children (that is, the
future supply of L and H) based directly on the anticipated future skill-premium, and thus
(indirectly) on recent technological developments. As such the model allows for the co-
evolution of both factors and technologies.
3The third key feature is that our model can be conﬁgured either as a closed-economy
model or as an open-economy model. In our benchmark simulations, where we try to cali-
brate the model to match the British economy from circa 1750 to the present, the choice of
conﬁguration cannot be treated as constant over time. It is our maintained assumption that,
to a ﬁrst approximation, the closed economy assumption might be more appropriate from
1750 to 1850, but that after that time, an open economy assumption might be more appro-
priate, once the ﬁrst era of globalization started to take shape (O’Rourke and Williamson
2002a, 2005). On the other hand, the British economy presumably did not undergo a dis-
continuous switch from a closed to an open state, and thus we will impose continuously
declining transport costs to achieve such a transition.
In this framework, we argue that the Industrial Revolution initially consisted of a rapid
succession of unskilled-labor biased technological innovations. This is what explains the
Luddites’ unhappiness, and it produced an initial decline in the return to skills. Because
declining skill premia induced population expansion and limited human capital accumulation,
income per capita in these regions remained relatively low. Indeed, our model suggests
that north-western Europe (the “North”) required both a highly-developed knowledge base
(in order to begin to innovate in high-skill sectors) and highly-developed global transport
technologies (in order to specialize in high-skill products) to reverse demographic trends.
Both of these took time to appear in the later nineteenth century. They eventually placed
the North on the road to riches, forcing a demographic reversal in the North, with rising
education levels and population growth held in check after a demographic transition. Thus
the robust growth in income per capita enjoyed by Northern economies is really a two-part
story, two centuries in the making.
Elsewhere, in the developing world (the “South”), these shocks would play the opposite
role: encouraging specialization in low-skill goods, discouraging education and skill accu-
mulation, and inhibiting the demographic transition. Hence, we join Galor and Mountford
(2004) in arguing that the nature of trade may have played a large role in the Great Diver-
gence. As we will see within the framework of co-evolving factors and techniques, a country
that has a static comparative advantage in skill-intensive production may ultimately have
a dynamic advantage as well. Hence by looking more closely at the factor-composition
of traded products, we may be able to better reconcile theory and reality. For example,
Clark (2007) asserts that by 1900, cities such as Alexandria in Egypt, Bombay in India, and
Shanghai in China were all, in terms of transport costs, capital markets, and institutional
structures fully integrated into the British and other Western economies. Yet perhaps due
to the nature of trade, these societies were unable keep up with the West, leading to an
ever-widening income gap in the world economy.
Pointing to such a theoretical link between trade and the Great Divergence is not in
itself novel, but we argue that there are several key features which distinguish this exercise
from that of Galor and Mountford. While they construct a semi-Ricardian trade model
(in which countries are initially distinguished by technological diﬀerences), we construct a
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model in which countries initially diﬀer due to factor endowment
4diﬀerences, and argue that a Great Divergence was possible even in the context of perfect
technology diﬀusion. Moreover, we allow for the gradual opening of goods trade, whereas
Galor and Mountford investigate the implications of moving from autarky to free trade; thus
we can better track the continually strengthening forces of globalization of the late nineteenth
century which reached their apotheosis in 1913. We incorporate an explicit research and
development model into our account of growth, which they do not, and also explore the
endogenous evolution of the factor bias of technological change, an issue which they do not
address. Finally, in this paper we will test our theory by seeing to what extent the model
can track the evolution of key variables such as fertility rates, education rates, wages and
skill premia.
To make the nature of the empirical challenge clearer, and to explain why the extant
uniﬁed growth theories fall short in some important respects, we now turn to the empirical
evidence and the speciﬁc patterns in the long-run data that we seek to match.
1 The Evidence
1.1 Income and Population Growth
The ﬁrst stylized fact which any uniﬁed growth theory, including our own, must be able to
match is the striking coincidence between the development of sustained per capita income
growth on the one hand, and population growth on the other. This association, which is
stressed by Galor (2005) in his review of which stylized facts must be addressed by uniﬁed
growth theories, comes across clearly in Figure 1, which is taken from Galor (2005) and
based on data taken from Maddison (2001). As the ﬁgure shows, there were dramatic
accelerations in both per capita income growth and population growth after 1820 in both
Western Europe and the “Western oﬀshoots” (the United States, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand). There were similar patterns in Latin America and Africa as well, but the
transitions to per capita income and population growth took place later in these continents.
Everywhere, however, income and population growth went hand in hand, at least initially.
As we will see, the leading regions eventually experienced a demographic transition to lower
fertility rates, which raises the question of why growth and fertility were initially positively
correlated with each other, but were negatively correlated thereafter.
1.2 Human Capital Formation and the Fertility Transition
Figure 2 plots the crude birth rates and primary school enrollment rates for four relatively
developed countries through the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. In
general, while birth rates either rose or remained high during the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth
century, they began to fall signiﬁcantly some time after 1870 (while the decline began earlier
in the United States, note that it started the early 1800s with a signiﬁcantly higher fertility
rate than other comparable regions). During the same period, education levels began to
5rise. Thus it would appear that in relatively developed regions, a dramatic substitution
from quantity to quality of children was beginning a hundred years after the start of the
Industrial Revolution. By the late twentieth century, this transition was underway in the
less developed world as well. A model proﬀering itself as a uniﬁed growth theory would have
to account for the timing and nature of this shift in some fashion.
These facts raise the questions: why did the demand for education not rise with the initial
wave of industrialization? Why did the demand for education signiﬁcantly rise only by the
second half of the 1800s? Further, why did educational attainment not rise in the developing
world until well into the latter half of the twentieth century? A theory of growth linking the
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries should oﬀer some response to these questions.
1.3 The Explosion of International Trade
Although inter-continental trade had been growing for centuries, the rate of growth acceler-
ated dramatically during the nineteenth century. Both O’Rourke and Wiliamson (2002b) and
de Vries (2003) estimate that inter-continental trade grew at around 1% per annum between
1500 and 1800, but it has grown at around 3.5% per annum since the end of the Napoleonic
Wars. In 1820, the ratio of merchandise trade to world GDP was just 1%, but it was eight
times this in 1913 (Hanson 1980; Maddison 1995). Just as important, all regions of the
world participated in this unprecedented trade boom. The data in Lewis (1981) imply that
tropical country exports grew at an annual real rate of 2.9% between 1850 and 1913. This
implied that economies with radically diﬀerent endowments of unskilled labor, skilled labor
and physical capital were becoming increasingly inter-linked through trade, especially after
the middle of the nineteenth century, when trade costs really started to plummet (Harley
1988; Shah Mohammed and Williamson 2004; Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Taylor 2003; Jacks,
Meissner, and Novy 2006), and our modeling will have to take account of this fact as well.
1.4 Skill Premia During the Industrial and Demographic Revolu-
tions
Figure 3 plots the skill premium between 1700 and 1910, based on decadal averages of
wages for craftsmen and laborers in the English building trades (based on the data in Clark
2005). As can be seen, skill premia were slightly above 60% during the ﬁrst half of the
eighteenth century, but then fell through the 1810s, to below 50%. There was a recovery
in the 1820s, and premia remained above 50% until the 1870s, when they declined again,
to below 45%. Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, skill premia fell during the second
half of the eighteenth century with the onset of the Industrial Revolution, and it remains
a challenge to explain this pattern in a uniﬁed growth model. A major modelling goal of
this paper, as already stressed, will be to reconcile this initial decline in skill premia with
the fact that technological change appeared to be driving skill premia up by the end of the
twentieth century.
62 The Model
In this section we build a theoretical version of a closed ‘English’ economy in successive
steps, keeping the points enumerated in Section 1 ﬁrmly in mind. Section 2.1 illustrates the
method used to solve the static general equilibrium model. Section 2.2 allows the economy
to evolve over time, and develops a method for endogenizing the scope and direction of
technical change, keeping endowments ﬁxed. Finally section 2.3 merges the model with an
overlapping generations framework in order to endogenize demographic variables. These
three parts form an integrated dynamic model which we use to analyze the industrialization
of England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
2.1 Production
We begin by illustrating the static general equilibrium of a hypothetical economy. The





















where α ∈ [0,1] and σ ≥ 0. σ is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
Heuristically, one might think of the ﬁnal good Y as being “GDP” which is aggregated up
from three sectoral outputs xi.
The intermediate goods are produced with the following technologies.






x3 = A3H3 (4)
The coeﬃcients A1, A2, and A3 represent sector-speciﬁc technologies that respectively aug-
ment sectors 1, 2 and 3. Total endowments in this static case are given by the total amount
of unskilled labor, L = L1 + L2, and the total amount of skilled labor, H = H2 + H3. Thus
sector one strictly utilizes raw labor, sector three strictly utilizes skilled labor, and sector
two requires both. Throughout the paper, we will call A1 unskilled-labor biased technology,
and A3 skill-biased technology.
Production here is a variant of Cu˜ nat and Maﬀezzoli (2002). We use these technologies
instead of the standard ones used in typical Heckscher-Ohlin models because this allows us to
focus on factor-biased technological developments. Dividing the economy into three sectors
greatly abstracts from reality but produces a useful tool of analysis. Economic outcomes
heavily depend on which factors (i.e., in this model, sectors) enjoy superior productivity
performance. Some authors use loaded terms such as “modern” and “traditional” to label
the fast and slow growing sectors, at least in models where sectors are associated with
7types of goods (e.g., manufacturing and agriculture). We employ neutral language, since we
contend that growth can emanate from diﬀerent sectors at diﬀerent times, where ‘sectors’ in
our model are set up to reﬂect factor biases in technology. We argue that sector 1 was the
leading sector during the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, while sector 3 signiﬁcantly
modernized only from the mid-1800s onwards.
Treating the technological coeﬃcients as exogenous for the time being, we can assume
that markets for both the ﬁnal good and intermediate goods are perfectly competitive. Thus,
prices are equal to unit costs. Solving the cost minimization problems for production, and




































where naturally pz denotes the price for intermediate good xz.
























Finally, the demands for intermediate goods from ﬁnal producers can be derived from
a standard C.E.S. objective function (so demands will be negatively related to own price,
will be a function of a price index, and will be proportional to total product). Speciﬁcally,





















for i = 1,2,3, Υ1 = Υ3 = α/2, and Υ2 = 1 − α.
Substituting (5) into the expressions for intermediate-goods demands simpliﬁes these
equations somewhat. Provided that we have values for L, H, A1, A2 and A3, along with
parameter values, this yields eight equations with eight unknowns: p1, p2, p3, x1, x2, x3, wl
and wh. The solution for these variables constitutes the solution for the static model in the
case of exogenously determined technological and demographic variables.
8The predictions of our model will depend heavily on the parameters σ and α. The
elasticity of substitution between goods, σ, plays a critical role in determining how changes
in technologies or factors aﬀect prices and wages. For example, suppose that there is an
exogenous increase in A1, the technological coeﬃcient for sector one. Because this sector
employs only raw labor, we can expect some unskilled labor to migrate from sector two to
sector one. This will lower p1 and raise p2 regardless of the elasticity of substitution. But the
skill premium, wh/wl, will fall if and only if σ > 1. In other words, in order for technological
advances in a single-factor sector to be biased towards that factor, intermediates must be
grossly substitutable. Furthermore, an increase in A1 can actually induce a drop in the
absolute value of skilled wages if goods are suﬃciently substitutable.
Similarly, an exogenous increase in the supply of one factor of production will lower the
price of the good that uses that factor intensively, and raise the price of the good that uses
the other factor intensively. The extent of these price shifts however will depend on σ; the
lower the substitutability, the more violently will prices react to an endowment shock.
Finally, α proxies for the importance of each sector. The smaller α is, the closer produc-
tion is to a Cobb-Douglas technology. The larger α is, the larger are the roles of sectors one
and three, and so the more specialized are the roles of the factors of production. The role of
technological biases, something that we turn to next, will exert itself quite forcefully as long
as these sectors play heavy roles in the economy.
2.2 Endogenous Technological Biases
We now endogenize the evolution of the sectoral technology levels. Inspired by the work
of Acemoglu (1998), we model technological development as improvements in the quality
of a ﬁxed number of products. Speciﬁcally, we assume that researchers expend resources
to improve the quality of a machine, and receive the revenues for the sale of these new
machines for only one time period. For simplicity, we apply this idea to sectors 1 and 3 only.
In the context of this paper, we can think of A1 and A3 as amalgamations of quality-adjusted
machines that augment either unskilled labor employed in sector 1, or skilled labor employed
in sector 3, but not both. In this way we can think of quality improvements to machines
that will favor one sector (and hence, one factor) relative to another. We further assume
that these technological advances “spill-over” into sector 2 after a delay, so that eventually
both types of labor are augmented no matter which of the three sectors they work in. (We
could also explicitly model innovation in sector 2, but the insights would not be so diﬀerent.)
In our model, costly innovation will be undertaken to improve some machine j (designed
to be employed either in sector 1 or 3), get the blueprints for this newly improved machine,
use these blueprints to produce the machine, and sell these machines to the producers of
the intermediate good, all in the same time period. After this time, the blueprints to this
machine j become publicly known, in which case either machine j is competitively produced,
or some other innovator improves machine j again.1 In this fashion we simplify the process
1Conceptually one may assume either that patent rights to innovation last one time period, or equivalently
9of “creative destruction” as described by Schumpeter (1934) and reﬁned by Aghion and
Howitt (1992), where successful researchers along the quality dimension tend to eliminate
the monopoly rentals of their predecessors. Here monopoly rights to new machine j last just
one time period whether or not there is a new innovation to machine j.
Intermediate Goods Production























where 0 < β < 1. Ml are machines that are strictly employed by unskilled workers in
sector one, while Mh are machines that are strictly employed by skilled workers in sector
three. qz(j) is the highest quality of machine j of type z. Note that these technological
coeﬃcients may thus be interpreted simply as functions of diﬀerent types of capital per
diﬀerent types of workers; the capital however in this case is specialized and quality-adjusted.
The speciﬁcations here imply constant returns to scale in the productions of x1 and x3, and
so the number of ﬁrms that produce these intermediate goods is conveniently indeterminate.
Innovation in a sector takes the form of an improvement in the quality of a machine by
a certain multiple. We assume that each machine has a ‘quality ladder’ with widely spaced
rungs. These quality levels are discrete and increments in quality are not inﬁnitesimal.
We further assume that these increments are suﬃciently large so that new, high quality
machines are always strictly preferred to old, low quality machines. Thus, when the quality
qz(j) for machines of type j rises, only the latest, best-quality machines of type j are used
in production, and all older, lower quality designs for machines of type j are unproﬁtable for
use. In particular, we shall assume that this is true even when the new machine is produced
at a “high” price by a monopolist, despite the public availability of “legacy blueprints” from
which older machines can be produced at a “low” price by competitive ﬁrms under free entry.
(This condition always holds by construction in the simulations that follow.)
In the end, we care less about micro diﬀerences in machine qualities than about macro
eﬀects on total factor productivity. To draw conclusions about the latter we note that our
problem is symmetric at the sector level, implying that aggregation is straightforward. In
particular, machines along the (0,1) continuum will on average be of symmetrical quality, as
inventors will be indiﬀerent as to which particular machines along the continuum they will
improve (as we will see below). As such we can alternatively write equation (12) as
that it takes one time period to reverse engineer the development of a new machine. Either assumption ﬁts





























0 qk(j)dj denotes the “quality index” for machines used in sector k ∈ {1,3}.
Increases in this index directly increase the total factor productivity of the sector. In the
symmetric equilibrium, qk(j) = Qk is the same for all j, so Qk serves as a quality index for
all machines in sector k.
We assume that machines last one period, and then depreciate completely (but see
below—a single period in our simulations will be approximately ﬁve years of real time).
We also assume that once machines can be competitively produced, they can be used
anywhere by ﬁrms in suitable combination with the appropriate factor, including in sector
2. For analytic convenience we assume that intellectual property is not protected in sector
2; thus innovators do not improve machines for use in this sector. Instead L2 and H2 are
augmented by older versions of Ml and Mh, respectively. Thus, technological growth in
sectors 1 and 3 will also promote growth in sector 2, but with a delay of one time period.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that if A1 and A3 describe unskilled and skilled biased technologies






so that the technological coeﬃcient in sector 2 is simply a geometric weighting of past
technologies in sectors 1 and 3.
Our modeling approach reﬂects the idea that diﬀerent production techniques favor par-
ticular factors. For example, by way of initial conditions, preindustrial textile production
needed highly skilled labor such as spinners and weavers. Similarly, other preindustrial man-
ufactures relied on their own skilled artisans of various sorts. But changes followed: imple-
menting the technologies of the Industrial Revolution (in textile production, iron smelting
and reﬁning, mining and agriculture) required large labor forces with little to no special-
ized training, and happy, highly-valued skilled craftsmen became angry, machine-breaking
Luddites. Much later, fortunes changed again: the techniques developed in the nineteenth
century (for example in chemicals, electrical industries and services) raised the demand for
a new labor force with highly specialized skills. Finally, developments in both areas spilled
over into other sectors—for example, agriculture beneﬁtted from the metal drainage pipes
developed for manufacturers, and gas-lighting adapted for miners allowed skilled artisans to
work longer hours (Falkus 1982). These changes are proxied here as increases in A1, A3, and
A2 respectively.
Further, these patterns of directed technical change have been observed within particular
industries. Goldin and Katz (1998) for example note how the automobile industry began
as a highly skill-intensive industry. As production grew more automatized, skilled labor
was increasingly replaced by unskilled labor, culminating in Henry Ford’s assembly line
11processes. Only after WWII (with the expansion of trade and competition from Germany
and Japan) did car production in the U.S. become skill-intensive again, with the development
of continuation and batch processes.
Returning to the model, let us consider a representative ﬁrm that competitively produces
x1. (Much of what follows will deal with only sector 1. Parallel inferences can be made for
sector 3). Its maximization problem is stated as
max
{L1,Ml(j)}
p1 · A1L1 −
Z 1
0
pl(j)Ml(j)dj − wlL1 (15)
where pl(j) is the price of machine Ml(j) faced by all producers of x1. Hence the ﬁrm chooses
an amount of unskilled labor to hire and amounts of complementary machines to employ,
taking the price of its output, the price of machines, and the price of raw labor as given.
From the ﬁrst order condition on L1 we have
p1βA1 = wl (16)
Solving for the price of x1 we have p1 =
wl
βA1. From the ﬁrst order condition on machine j








The Gains from Innovation
Innovation in a sector takes the form of an improvement in the quality of a machine by a
certain multiple. Potential innovators expend resources up front to develop a better machine;
let us denote the amount of the ﬁnal good used in R&D to develop an improved blueprint
of machine j used in sector 1 as cl(j). Assume that innovation is deterministic; that is,
individuals who decide to research will improve the quality of a machine with a probability
of one. We assume that there is a ‘quality ladder’ with widely spaced rungs. Quality levels
are discrete and increments in quality are not inﬁnitesimal. We further assume that these
increments are suﬃciently large that new, high quality machines supplied monopolistically by
innovators are always strictly preferred to old, low quality machines produced competitively
from public-domain blueprints. Thus, once a new quality level is reached, all older versions
of that machine type are made obsolete.
Once the researcher spends the resources necessary to improve the quality of machine
j, she becomes the sole producer of this machine, and charges whatever price she sees ﬁt.
Thus she receives total revenue of pl(j)Ml(j). Solving for the price of machine j in (17) and







12Hence the marginal revenue is given by
MR = (1 − β)pl(j) (19)
Here we must make the distinction between the cost of producing a machine, and the cost
of inventing a better machine. We discuss the costs of innovation in the next sub-section.
Here, we assume that the cost of producing a machine is proportional to its quality, so that
better machines are more expensive to make—a form of diminishing returns. Indeed, we can
simply normalize this cost, so that
MC = ql(j) (20)
In order to maximize proﬁts, new machine producers will equate marginal revenue with
marginal cost. Equating (19) with (20) reveals that machine producers will charge a constant
markup over marginal cost, speciﬁcally, pl(j) = ql(j)/(1−β). Substituting this mark-up into
(17) gives us a demand equation for machines that is common for all machine types.







Current proﬁt for the producer of machine j is given by total revenue minus total cost,
or πl(j) = pl(j)Ml(j)−ql(j)Ml(j). Plugging in the mark-up equation for machine price, and













The Costs of Innovation
We now make assumptions about the costs of innovation. Assume that the resource costs of
research to improve machine j in sector 1 are given by







and that the resource costs of research to improve machine j in sector 3 are given by







with the assumption that φh > φl > 1. The variable B is our measure of current general
knowledge that we label Baconian knowledge.
The general assumptions in each sector are that research is more costly the higher is the
quality of machine one aspires to invent (another sort of diminishing returns), the higher is
the labor cost in that sector, and the lower is the stock of general knowledge. All this may
seem plausible. But how crucial are the particular choices we have made?
13Concerning wages and quality, it is convenient to assume that the research cost in each
sector is proportional to the cost of labor in that sector, but the model can also be solved
under more general forms (e.g. one might argue that it is only skilled labor that is needed
to innovate in any sector, so only skilled wages should appear above).
Concerning Baconian knowledge, however, whilst the above assumptions may seem un-
controversial, it is not just convenient, but also crucial for our argument, that φh > φl >
1. Why? We assume that broadening the Baconian knowledge base will lower the costs
of developing skill-intensive techniques more than those of developing unskilled-intensive
techniques. This implies that as B expands, it becomes relatively cheaper to develop skill-
intensive techniques. This assumption drives some of the key results in this paper. Is it
justiﬁed?
Related assumptions have been used before.2 We draw attention to Mokyr’s (2005a) no-
tion of competence, a concept hitherto largely neglected in theoretical models of the Industrial
Revolution. As Mokyr notes:
One of the most interesting variables to observe is the ratio between the knowl-
edge that goes into the ﬁrst formulation of the technique in question (invention)
and the competence needed to actually carry out the technique. As we shall see,
it is this ratio around which the importance of human capital in economic growth
will pivot... Technological change in the era of the Industrial Revolution, based
on invention, innovation, and implementation, did not necessarily require that
the entire labor force, or even most of it (much less the population at large), be
highly educated; the eﬀects of education depended on whether the relation be-
tween innovation and the growth of competence was strong and positive. (1123,
1157)
To adopt Mokyr’s terminology, our approach to this pivotal issue is to specify a dynamic
complementarity between the “invention knowledge” (represented here by the level of B),
and “competence” (given by the fact that increasing B tends to favor the production of
“complex” machines favoring those with more competence, which is represented here by an
increase in H).3 Consistent with Mokyr’s view we conjecture that during the early phases
of the Industrial Revolution (the “First Industrial Revolution”) “technological progress and
competence had a complex relation with one another because ingenuity and detailed propo-
sitional knowledge could be frontloaded in the instructions or artefacts, thus reducing the
competence needed to carry out the actual production” (Mokyr 2005a, p. 1158). That is, we
start oﬀ with unskilled bias. But we further conjecture that the same was not true for the
later Industrial Revolution and the subsequent epoch of modern economic growth stretching
2The assumption is in some ways similar to assumption (A2) of Galor and Mountford (2004, p. 23).
3This is an analogy and does not imply that human capital and competence are really the same thing.
As Mokyr (2005a) notes, there is a far from exact correspondence between the two. Competence may be
gained through education; but in part it may also be innate or acquired through experience.
14to the present. “Idiot prooﬁng” could not last forever—or else why are we all in school these
days? As knowledge has advanced, higher levels of competence have been favored by the
later, newly invented techniques. To say this is simply to admit that some kind of reversal
must have occurred to yield the twentieth century “stylized fact” of skill-biased technological
change.
Growth of Baconian Knowledge
We highlight the importance of Baconian knowledge B in inﬂuencing the level of technology
A. We have now speciﬁed the dynamics of A. But what are the plausible dynamics of B?
We allow general knowledge to grow throughout human history, irrespective of living
standards and independent of the applied knowledge embedded in actual technology levels.
According to Mokyr (2005b, 291–2), Bacon regarded “knowledge as subject to constant
growth, as an entity that continuously expands and adds to itself.” Accordingly, we assume
that the growth in basic knowledge depends on the existing stock. Furthermore, we assume
that Baconian knowledge grows according to how much skilled labor exists in the economy;4
speciﬁcally, we assume the simple form:
4Bt+1 = λ · Ht · Bt (25)
Thus we assume that increases in general knowledge (unlike increases in applied knowl-
edge) do not arise from any proﬁt motive, but are rather the fortuitous by-product of the
existence of a stock of skilled workers, as well as of accumulated stocks of Baconian knowl-
edge. But in our model, as we shall see, a skilled worker is just an educated worker, so it is
here that the link between productivity growth and human capital is made explicit.
Our functional forms (23) and (24) assume that low Baconian knowledge produces rel-
atively large costs to machine improvement, while high Baconian knowledge generates low
costs to machine improvement. In our model, of course, B will never fall since (25) ensures
that changes in B are nonnegative. Hence, the general knowledge set always expands.
This is not a historically trivial assumption, although it is accurate for the episode under
scrutiny: Mokyr (2005b, 338–9) comments on the fact that knowledge had been lost after
previous “eﬄorescences” (Goldstone 2002) in China and Classical Antiquity, and states that
“The central fact of modern economic growth is the ultimate irreversibility of the accumu-
lation of useful knowledge paired with ever-falling access costs.”
Free Entry Conditions
Turning to the decision to innovate in the ﬁrst place, we assume that all individuals are free
to do so. With free entry, the zero-proﬁt conditions which are guaranteed to hold at each
and every time period can be written as
4Again, Galor and Mountford (2004) make a rather similar assumption.




























∀j. If resource costs of research were actually less than the proﬁts to innovation, entry into
research would occur. From (22) we can see that the rising applied technology will lower
the proﬁt levels. On the other hand, if (26) and/or (27) were not to hold with equality, A1
and/or A3 would remain stagnant (a society can not collectively forget blueprints once they
are created). Thus we assume that applied technologies A1 and A3 (and thus the quality of
sector-speciﬁc machines) adjust so that (26) and (27) hold for all time periods as a result of
free entry.
It is here that our particular functional form assumptions prove convenient. Because
q(j) cancels from both sides of the zero-proﬁt conditions, we have equations which govern
the dynamics of aggregate technologies. This suits us because we are concerned more with
(observable) macroeconomic variables than with variations in (unobservable) microeconomic
outcomes.
Technology in the Long Run
Finally, dividing (27) by (26) and setting both to equality, we can solve for the long-run









Equation (28) encapsulates the long-run endogenous determination of technological bias.
Technological bias will depend on the relative quantity of factors, and on the relative im-
portance of general knowledge. In general, as a result of changes in the relative proﬁts from
innovation in the two sectors, there will be more innovation in sector 3 (1) if the supply of
the factor used intensively in sector 3 (1) rises, or if Baconian knowledge rises (falls). The
ﬁrst eﬀect corresponds to the market-size eﬀect emphasized in Acemoglu (1998), while the
second eﬀect reﬂects our assumption that general knowledge spurs the growth of applied
knowledge, but rather more so in the case of the skilled sector.
Hopefully by now the motivation for these modeling choices are apparent. We argue
that basic scientiﬁc knowledge has always grown throughout the history of mankind. This
growth was not driven by proﬁts, but rather by the incidental interactions of smart people,
institutional changes, and a host of other eﬀects that we treat as exogenous. But in order
for economic growth to occur, applied knowledge must grow as well. As (26) and (27) make
clear, applied innovations are motivated by proﬁts, and will not be proﬁtable until Baconian
knowledge reaches a certain critical threshold where beneﬁts exceed costs. The natural world
16needs to be suﬃciently intelligible before society can begin to master it (Mokyr 2002). Thus
our model embodies the idea that growth in general Baconian knowledge is a necessary but
not suﬃcient condition for output growth—an attribute surely essential in any uniﬁed model
aiming to explain more than two centuries of economic history.
Wages in the Long Run
Finally, we ask what the the long term economic consequences are for wages, as a result of
endowment changes. Since our ultimate goal is to endogenize factor endowments, we need
to understand the feedback from relative factor endowments (demography) to relative factor
rewards (the skill premium) and vice versa.
We will see in the next sub-section how the current skill-premium will incite demographic
shifts. Here we note how demographic shifts aﬀect wages. We can assert the following:
Proposition 1 If the level of H exogenously rises, and technologies respond endogenously,
the long-run skill premium will rise iﬀ σ >
1+β
β . We label the latter the suﬃcient substi-
tutability condition.
Proof: First we note that an exogenous increase in H results in an increase in H3 since the
skilled equate the marginal products of their labor in each sector. Calculating the marginal
productivity of raw labor in sector one and the marginal productivity of skilled labor in











σ. Solving this for A3
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Hence we can see that an increase in the ratio of employment in sector 3 to employment in
sector 1 will raise the long-run skill premium only if σβ − β − 1 > 0 ⇒ σ >
1+β
β . Q.E.D.
Henceforth, we shall assume that the suﬃcient substitutability condition holds. With
suﬃcient substitutability between intermediate goods in ﬁnal production, a relative increase
in the supply of one factor will promote technological growth biased towards that factor and
actually raise the relative wage earned by that factor. The demographic micro-foundations
of how the factors of production endogenously react to changes in the relative wages is the
subject of the next subsection.
2.3 Endogenous Demography
We now think about how to allow the factors of production to react to changing prices and
wages. In a very simpliﬁed model, we assume that ‘adult’ agents maximize their utility, which
depends both on their current household consumption and on their children’s expected future
income. In an abstraction of family life, we assume that individuals begin life naturally as
unskilled workers, accumulate human capital, and then decide as adults whether or not to
17become skilled workers. Because skilled labor is always paid some premium over unskilled
labor, adults always decide to work as skilled labor. Consequently the skilled and unskilled
are divided into two distinct age groups. That is, an agent evolves naturally from a ‘young’
unskilled worker into an ’adult’ skilled worker; thus his welfare will be aﬀected by both types
of wages.
With this in mind, we now adopt an overlapping generations framework where individuals
have two stages of life: young and adult. Only ‘adults’ are allowed to make any decisions
regarding demography. Speciﬁcally, the representative household is run by an adult who
decides two things: how many children to have (denoted nt) and the level of education
each child is to receive (denoted et). The number of children must be nonnegative and for
simplicity all households are assumed to be single-parent, with n = 1 being the replacement
level of fertility. The education level is constrained to the unit interval and is the fraction
of time the adult devotes to educating the young. We also impose an education constraint
on the adult, so that adults must give at least a bare minimum of education e > 0 to each
child.
Our modeling of demography is as follows. An individual born at time t spends fraction
et of her time in school (something chosen by her parent), while spending the rest of her
time as an unskilled laborer in either sectors one or two. At t+1, the individual (who is by
this time a mature adult) works strictly as a skilled laborer, using whatever human capital
she had accumulated as a child in sectors two or three.
The Adult Household Planner
Allowing for the time cost of child-rearing, we assume that the household consumes all
the income that the family members have generated. The adults, who are the household
planners, wish to maximize a weighted sum of current household consumption and the future
skilled income generated by their children. That is, the individual born at time t − 1, and
now an adult at time t, faces the problem
max
nt,et θ(Ih,t + Il,t − Ct) + (1 − θ)ntIh,t+1 (30)
subject to: 1) nt ≥ 0 2) et ≥ e Here Ih,t is income generated by a skilled
individual (the adult), Il,t is income generated by unskilled individuals (the children), and
Ct is the opportunity cost of child rearing. θ lies between zero and one. We assume the
following functional forms:
Ih,t = b wh,tΩe
k
t−1
Il,t = b wl,t(1 − et)nt
Ct = b wh,tn
ν
t(1 + et)
18When children are not being educated for a fraction of time 1 − e, they increase the
family’s unskilled income Il,t, but this will reduce their own future skilled income Ih,t+1.
That is because they will receive a lower endowment of H, where H = Ωek can be considered
the production of human capital, since it speciﬁes the amount of H produced from a given
education input e. Finally, whnν(1 + e) is a cost function for the adult arising from giving
n children an educational level e, and forsaking skilled work. This cost function can be
nonlinear in n, and it also includes a ﬁxed cost per child (normalized to 1 unit of time).
In our model, wages b wl and b wh are determined by equations (6), (7) and (8). Hat notation
is used to imply that households forecast these wages, given the technological coeﬃcients
that they perceive. Thus the individual born at t − 1 will choose a pair of {nt,et} that
maximizes (30), taking perceived wages as given.
Note that the individual makes decisions as an adult at time t, but bases the decision in
part on wh,t+1, something that is unknown to the individual. For our simulations below, we
shall simply assume that in maximizing (30) individuals treat the current skilled wage as the
forecast of the future skilled wage. This assumption of myopic wage forecasts dramatically
simpliﬁes the algebra without changing any key results. (We can produce qualitatively
identical results with a strict perfect foresight assumption.)
From (30), the ﬁrst-order condition for the number of children is:
θ b wl,t[1 − et] + (1 − θ) b wh,tΩe
k
t = θ b wh,tνn
ν−1
t (1 + et) (31)
The left-hand side illustrates the marginal beneﬁt of an additional child, while the right-
hand side denotes the marginal cost. At the optimum, the gains in income from an extra
unskilled worker in the family and in future skilled income precisely oﬀsets the foregone
current skilled-income that results from child-rearing.
Provided that et > e, the ﬁrst order condition for education is:
θ b wl,tnt + θ b wh,tn
ν
t = (1 − θ) b wh,tkntΩe
k−1
t (32)
Here the left-hand side is the marginal cost and the right-hand side the marginal beneﬁt.
At the optimum, the gains received from more skilled income at t + 1 oﬀsets the foregone
unskilled- and skilled-income required for an additional unit of education for all children at
t.
Endowments in the Short Run
Given these functional forms, we want to know how changes in wages aﬀect fertility and
education decisions. The following proposition sheds some light on this.
Proposition 2 The arguments which solve equation (30), {n∗
t,e∗















if µ > 1, 0 < k < 1, and et > e.









































if et > e (34)
Thus we see that households who observe a rising skill premium will simultaneously lower
fertility and raise education rates so long as there are diminishing returns to education and
convex costs in the number of children. Note once again that if et = e a rising skill premium
will still induce families to reduce fertility. Also note that demographic decisions made by
households are solely based on skilled and unskilled wages that are observed in the current
time period. Of course, as we will see in the next section, after fertility and education
rates are determined, the wage structure will inevitably change due either to technological
or international shifts. Households thus behave myopically, since they are not permitted to
“anticipate” the wages of subsequent time periods. More sophisticated agents might very
well make better informed decisions concerning the quality and quantity of their children,
and make themselves better oﬀ in the process, but such (ahistorical) sophistication would
not alter any of the qualitative conclusions of the paper, as we have said.
Endowments in the Long Run
Finally let us note that education and fertility rates translate directly into levels of unskilled
labor in the current time period and skilled labor in the next time period. That is,




As long as we ensure that ∂L/∂n > 0 and ∂H/∂e > 0, increases in fertility rates will
immediately translate into increased levels of unskilled labor, while increases in education will
eventually translate into increased levels of skilled labor next period. Thus given Proposition
2, an exogenous raising of the skill premium will immediately decrease the growth of the
overall population, and will increase the subsequent level of human capital in the economy.
The combination of Propositions 1 and 2 summarize the long-run co-evolution of factors
and technologies in the model. Here, given the necessary parameter restrictions, an increase
in the share of skilled labor will induce both an increase in the long-run skill premium (by
skewing the technological frontier towards skill-biased technologies by Proposition 1), while
further increasing the future share of skilled workers in the workforce (by Proposition 2).
Thus eﬀects on the demand and supply of labor types tend to be self-reinforcing. With this
demand-supply backdrop in mind, we turn to the historical puzzles of the Industrial and
Demographic Revolutions.
203 A Tale of Three “Revolutions”
We are now ready to see how well our model can account for what happened in England (and
other northwestern European economies) and the rest of the world during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.
We begin by considering two economies, a “northern” economy and a “southern” econ-
omy, each which is described by the modeling choices of section 2. We assume that applied
technologies are developed in the North according to section 2.2, and diﬀuse gradually to
the South. Thus northern technological developments are mirrored in the South, albeit with
some lag. This would appear to match the reality that almost all R&D has occurred—and
still does—in the “north” (Sachs 2000).
If only the north innovates, then either TFP doesn’t spillover to the south (and divergence
is inevitable) or else we must specify a technological diﬀusion process. Since the Great
Divergence is something we seek to explain—rather than trivialize—we take the latter route,
and assume a technological catch-up process in the south. As the North develops a greater
pool of machine blueprints, we assume that a certain fraction of these blueprints are accessible
to the South, who then can produce their own skill-using and unskilled-labor-using machines.
Recall that Qk denotes the average quality of machines used in sector k. We will assume







k,t), 0 < ρ < 1, k ∈ {1,3} (37)
These indices in turn determine the technological coeﬃcients in the South (see Appendix
for details). We simulate this process by choosing a value of ρ = 0.1 calibrated using recent
empirical research on the speed of technological diﬀusion (Dowrick and Rogers 2002; Comin
et al. 2006). In this setting, where a period is ﬁve years, the implied speed of technological
convergence is roughly 2% per annum.
In our simulations, we initially assume that the North and South are closed to trade due
to prohibitively high transport costs. The North goes through both an industrial revolution
and a subsequent demographic transition into modern economic growth that is inevitably
mirrored in the South. We highlight the initial Industrial Revolution in section 3.1, and the
Demographic Transition and modern economic growth in section 3.2. Section 3.3 considers a
similar scenario where trade in goods between the North and the South occurs as transport
costs fall. Trade eventually grows and this generates income gains in both regions even as it
exacerbates income divergence. The simulation results for both cases are described in section
3.4.
3.1 The Industrial Revolution
A critical part of the argument oﬀered here is that the Industrial Revolution was really a
sequence of unskilled-labor intensive technological developments. These developments ﬁrst
appeared in England and Wales in the latter half of the eighteen century, and then spread
21to other parts of continental Europe and European “oﬀshoots” in the early part of the
nineteenth century.
Our theory here suggests a number of things concerning this revolution. First, implicit in
our model is that the institutional framework protecting intellectual property rights had been
in place far before the onset of the Industrial Revolution (at least in ‘Northern’ economies).
Hence we do not rely on an exogenous institutional story to launch the Industrial Revolution.
Rather, we rely on basic scientiﬁc (Baconian) knowledge to rise above a certain threshold level
in order for applied innovation to become feasible. Once this happened in certain Northern
economies, the growth of technologies and output became possible. Secondly, technological
developments tended to heavily employ unskilled labor, for this factor of production was in
relatively great supply in these areas. Finally, by increasing the relative earnings of unskilled
labor, these technological developments spurred population growth and at the same time
limited the growth of human capital.
We can see these propositions within the context of the model. An economy before
its launch into the Industrial Revolution may be described by the one in section 2.1, with
technological coeﬃcients A1, A2, and A3 constant. Here wages are ﬁxed, and thus the levels
of raw labor and human capital remain ﬁxed as well. Both output and output per capita
remain stagnant.
If we assume that the evolution of technological coeﬃcients A1 and A3 are described
by the relationships in section 2.2, then the economy must wait until Baconian knowledge
grows to a suﬃcient level before applied innovation becomes possible. Further, technological
growth will initially be unskilled-labor biased (that is, there is growth in A1) so long as
it becomes proﬁtable to improve machines used in sector 1 before it becomes proﬁtable to
improve machines used in sector 3. The proﬁtability of innovation is governed by equations
(26) and (27). Thus if the economy begins such that A1 = A3 (as we maintain in the
simulations), initial technological growth will be unskilled labor biased so long as there is
relatively more unskilled labor than skilled labor in the economy, which was surely the case
in the eighteenth century.
Furthermore, these technological developments change the wage structure, and by im-
plication the evolution of factors. The growth of A1 lowers the skill premium, and by
Proposition 2, increases the future ratio of unskilled labor to skilled labor. This further
increases the incentives for innovators to develop better quality machines for sector 1, fur-
ther increasing subsequent levels of A1, and so on. This is a major emphasis of our model
and this paper. Unlike all extant “uniﬁed” models of the Industrial Revolution and Modern
Economic Growth, we try to take the Luddites seriously: population boomed, and skilled
labor was initially hurt by the Industrial Revolution, a historical fact that many current
theories fail to explain.
Note that even if both types of machines are being developed, so that both (26) and
(27) hold with equality, technological growth can still be unskilled-labor biased. Equation
(28) describes the mix of skilled- and unskilled-biased technologies when both are being
developed. So long as growth in the employment of sector 1 exceeds that of sector 3, and
22Baconian knowledge remains relatively small, A1 will grow faster than A3. Of course this
will tend to narrow the skill-premium (by Proposition 1); so long as intermediate goods used
in ﬁnal production are substitutable enough, this initial wave of industrialization will be
self-perpetuating, fostering continual increases in unskilled labor and improvements in A1.
This seems consistent with history. Well-known studies such as Atack (1987) and Sokoloﬀ
(1984) describe the transition of the American economy from reliance on highly-skilled arti-
sans to the widespread mechanization of factories. And Goldin and Katz (1998) assert that
technological advances which led to standardization and assembly-line production processes
inevitably replaced skilled workers with raw labor. This paper further argues that the boom
in fertility that the industrializing areas experienced was both the cause and consequence of
these technological revolutions arising, in the British case, in the late 1700s and early 1800s.
According to Folbre (1994), the development of industry in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries led to changes in family and household strategies. The early pattern
of rural and urban industrialization in this period meant that children could be employed
in factories at quite a young age. The implication is that children became an asset, whose
labor could be used by parents to contribute income to the household. In English textile
factories in 1835, for example, 63% of the work force consisted of children aged 8-12 and
women (Nardinelli 1990). This is not to say that attitudes toward children were vastly dif-
ferent in England then compared with now; rather economic incentives were vastly diﬀerent
then compared with now. As a result of these conditions, fertility rates increased during the
period of early industrialization.
While our approach may help explain the population growth that coincided with the
initial stages of the Industrial Revolution,5 we are still faced with the challenge of explain-
ing the demographic transition that followed it. Here we have two options. The ﬁrst is
to assume that skill-biased innovations become inherently easier to implement as general
scientiﬁc knowledge grows larger. Indeed there is some intuitive appeal to this idea, and we
invoke it by assuming that φl < φh. The second option is to impose some other exogenous
change that shifts the focus of the economy to skill-intensive production, such as growing
inter-continental trade. We now broach each of these topics in turn.
3.2 The Demographic Transition
Human capital presents a challenge for would-be uniﬁed growth theories: it appears to
hardly play any role at all in the Industrial Revolution, yet clearly is central to the story
of growth both in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth centuries. We argue
that industrialization took on a new form around the mid-1800s, and that this development
shifted the world economy in ways that continue to manifest themselves today.
5Of course there are a host of other explanations, including falling death rates related to health improve-
ments, and the passage of various Poor Laws. Naturally we are abstracting from these possibilities without
dismissing them as inconsequential.
23The educational stagnation in England of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies starkly contrasts with the large school enrollment rates of the late nineteenth century.
Schoﬁeld (1968) reveals very modest rises in signature rates at marriage (a mark of society-
wide illiteracy) from 1780 to 1830, and Mitch (1982) highlights the 1818 and 1833 parochial
surveys of elementary schooling which indicate that the proportion of all students enrolled
in schools remained constant at 42%. Contrastingly by the turn of the twentieth century in
England there was virtually universal literacy and primary school enrollment.
At the same time there was a marked decrease in fertility rates in England and other
regions of western Europe. Crude birth rates in England declined by 44% from 1875-1920,
while those for Germany, Sweden and Finland between 1875 and 1920, and France between
1865 and 1910, declined by 37%, 32%, 32% and 26% respectively (Andorka 1978; Kuczynski
1969). These trends suggest a reversal in the relationship between income and fertility,
corresponding to an increase in the level of resources invested in each child.
Part of our argument is that biases inherent in technological growth fostered this reversal.
As Baconian knowledge rose further and skill-biased production grew in importance (since
by assumption φl < φh), the labor of children became less important as a source of family
income, and this was reﬂected in English legislation. The Family Acts passed in Britain
limited the employment possibilities for children (Folbre 1994). The costs of raising children
and socializing children also rose as urbanization proceeded, child labor became restricted,
and compulsory education developed. Further, children achieved independence at a fairly
early age, so they did not contribute to the household when the parents were in middle age.
The old pact between parents and children that allowed parents to gain beneﬁts from the
labor of children through early adulthood began to be broken. On all economic counts then,
children turned from a ﬁnancial asset into an economic liability.
Recent studies make a variety of related points which can also explain the demographic
transition. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) suggest that technological change at this stage of de-
velopment increased the wage diﬀerential between parental labor and child labor, inducing
parents to reduce the number of their children and to further invest in their quality, stimu-
lating human capital formation, a demographic transition, and a shift to a state of sustained
economic growth. In contrast, Doepke (2004) stresses the regulation of child labor. Alter-
natively, the rise in the importance of human capital in the production process may have
induced industrialists to support laws that abolished child labor, inducing a reduction in
child labor and stimulating human capital formation and a demographic transition (Doepke
and Zilibotti 2003; Galor and Moav 2006).
3.3 The Trade Revolution
The second cause of the demographic transition in our account is the opening of the Euro-
pean economy to inter-continental trade in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In our
model, we assume that there is some technological diﬀusion from the North to the South,
and so we abstract away from any exogenous technological diﬀerences in explaining the
24Great Divergence. This is consistent with studies suggesting that English innovations dif-
fused rapidly to other economies: Mokyr (1999) discusses many examples of English exports
of micro-inventions (intended or otherwise), and Clark (1987) shows how late-nineteenth
century India used the same textile machines as those employed in Lancashire.
We now consider the case of trade in intermediate goods 1 and 3, but these face ‘iceberg’
costs which evolve over time. Early on these iceberg costs are quite high, so trade is limited;
as transport technologies grow, these costs fall and eventually trade volumes rise. This trade
is motivated by diﬀerences in factor endowments, as in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin
model, and diﬀerences in technologies, as in the Ricardian trade model. We assume that the
North is relatively skill-abundant, and that the South is relatively unskilled-labor-abundant;
thus the North will export good 3, while the South will export good 1.















































where Z1 is the amount of good 1 that is exported by the South, Z3 is the amount of good
3 that is exported by the North, and 0 < a1 < 1 and 0 < a3 < 1 are iceberg factors for
goods 1 and 3 (i.e. the proportion of exports not lost in transit). Thus the North imports
only a fraction a1 of Southern exports, and the South imports only a fraction a3 of Northern
















> a1 · a3, Z1 = Z3 = 0.
If transport costs are large relative to cross-country price diﬀerences, no trade occurs.
Over time, rising levels of a1 and a3 will induce positive and rising levels of Z1 and Z3. Note
that we assume that there is no trade in x2 - because this is produced using both L and
H, diﬀerences in p2 are very small, and thus the assumption is not particularly restrictive.6
Further, the limiting case of a1 = a3 = 1 produces goods and factor price convergence, and
thus replicates the integrated equilibrium, even in the absence of trade in good 2. The trade
equilibrium is described in more detail in Appendix A.
In such a set-up, trade between the North and South will (ceteris paribus) raise skill
premia in the North, and lower them in the South. Thus, trade will promote rising education
and falling fertility in the North, and this in turn will promote skill-biased technological
change. However, the opposite will be true for the South: there, trade leads to falling skill
premia, rising Southern fertility rates, and no human capital growth.7
6Indeed, trade in all three goods would produce an analytical problem. It is well known among trade
economists that when there are more traded goods than factors of production, country-speciﬁc production
levels, and hence trade volumes, become indeterminate. See Melvin (1968) for a thorough discussion.
7A similar impact on demography and education is seen in the model of Galor and Mountford (2004), but
253.4 Simulations
Both the closed and open economy models described above are numerically simulated. Each
generation is roughly 25-30 years in length, so each period is to be thought of as around 5
years long, and around one ﬁfth of families are thought to adjust their fertility and education
rates in each period.
For each time period, we solve the model as follows:
1) Baconian knowledge grows according to (25).
2) Solve the equilibrium described in section 2.1 or Appendix A, depending on whether
we are simulating the closed or the open economy model.
3) Using wages produced in 2), solve for demographic variables Lt and Ht+1 as described
in section 2.3.
4) Using new Baconian knowledge from 1) and employment levels from 2), solve for new
levels of A1, A2 and A3 as described in section 2.2.
Case 1: The Closed Economy
In this case we simulate an English economy and a “southern” economy through 30 time
periods, roughly accounting for the time period 1750-1910. Here we consider a1 and a3 to
be low enough that trade between the North and South never occurs. The results are given
in Figures 4–9, with the parameterizations used being summarized at the bottom of Figure
4. Here we simply note that the gross elasticity of substitution is set high enough (σ = 3)
so that Proposition 1 holds. Initial technologies are set as A1 = 1, A2 = 1, A3 = 1 for both
regions, and B = 1. Initial levels of labor are Ln = 2, Hn = 1, Ls = 2 and Hs = 0.6, so that
both economies begin with more unskilled labor. This produces an initial skill premium of
1.4 in the North and 1.9 in the South. These ﬁgures are consistent with the evidence in van
Zanden (2004) that skill premia were lower in Europe than in India, Japan or Korea during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Figure 4 illustrates the market for innovation in the North. Initial Baconian knowledge
B is set low enough so that the costs of innovation are larger than the beneﬁts early on. As
a result technology levels remain stagnant at ﬁrst. Valuations catch up with costs ﬁrst for
technologies designed for sector 1; hence, at t = 2 A1 begins to grow in both regions. By
contrast, πh < ch early on, so that A3 remains ﬁxed. Note that this results solely because Ln
1,
the employment of northern unskilled labor in sector 1, is larger than Hn
3, the employment
of northern skilled labor in sector 3. In other words, endowments dictate that the Industrial
Revolution will initially be unskilled-biased. Hence, resources ﬂow out of sector 3 and into
sector 1. Rising levels of Ln
1 and falling levels of Hn
3 make πl rise and πh fall, reinforcing the
Industrial Revolution while at the same time delaying the transition to modern growth.
However, at t = 11 costs of developing skill-intensive techniques have fallen enough so
the result is demand-driven, and in that model the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor is inﬁnitely
elastic at a constant exogenous skill premium determined by ﬁxed relative costs of rearing.
26that A3 begins to grow as well. This induces something of an endogenous demographic
transition; fertility rates reverse directions, while human capital levels remain ﬁxed.
Figures 5 through 8 depict historical and simulated time series for fertility rates, education
rates, wages and skill-premia. As can be seen, our model reproduces the early rise in fertility,
followed by falling fertility and rising education. Education rates remain at e for much of
the Industrial Revolution, and rise only after signiﬁcant increases in A3. Wages rise very
modestly during the Industrial Revolution, and rise signiﬁcantly only with the development
of skill-intensive techniques. The skill premium in both regions narrows initially, and then
rises, provoking the demographic transition.
Finally, note that because of technological diﬀusion, the South is able to keep up with the
economic growth of the North. The relative income gap between the North and the South is
illustrated in Figure 14 (lower panel, “closed case”). The gap rises after innovation in each
sector in the North begin to grow (after t = 2 in the unskilled sector, and after t = 10 in the
skilled sector), but the South is subsequently able to catch up due to the diﬀusion of Northern
blueprints. Indeed, we see slight convergence between the North and the South precisely
when we believe we should see divergence (that is, from the 1870s onward). Furthermore,
the model implies that demographic trends in the South closely mirror those in the North,
for the simple reason that Southern technology is mimicking Northern technology, but with
a lag.
Thus we see that an account of North-South interactions based solely on lags in biased
knowledge diﬀusion produces some counter-factual results. To deal with this, we introduce
specialization patterns arising from gradually increasing inter-continental trade between both
regions. We turn to this case next.
Case 2: The Gradual Opening of Two Economies
Again we have two economies: the North and the South. Here however, iceberg costs evolve.
The fraction of traded goods that are not lost in transit, a1 and a3, are initially set high
enough so that trade becomes possible halfway into the simulation (speciﬁcally, a1 = a3 =
0.865). After this point, the North specializes in and exports x3, while the South specializes
in and exports x1. However, all three goods are produced by both regions at all times.
We attempt to “calibrate” these iceberg costs using historical freight rates. The top
of Figure 9 illustrates trends in measured freight rates where the mid-eighteenth century is
normalized to 100, based on the data in Harley (1988) and Shah Mohammed and Williamson
(2004). These rise slightly until 1800, and then continually fall until the Great War. Thus,
if freightt is the freight rate at time t, iceberg coeﬃcients are calculated as:
ak,t = (ak,0 − 1) ∗ freightt + 1 (40)
for k ∈ {1,3} and initial levels ak,0. The bottom of Figure 9 illustrate this time series, which
is simply the mirror image of the freight rates. Technological and demographic relations
evolve precisely as before, while equilibrium is now described by Appendix A.
27This case is illustrated in Figures 10–14. Figure 10 shows the evolution of technological
developments in the North; these essentially echo those for the closed-economy case. Note
however that subsequent growth in skilled-intensive innovation is far more robust in this
case. This result occurs because trade becomes possible halfway through the simulation,
allowing the North to specialize in skill-intensive production and raising the rewards to skill
accumulation. Furthermore, labor ﬂows from sector 1 to 2 in order to complement rising
levels of H2. The combination of falling L1 and rising A3 reinforces the transition, so that
growth in unskilled-intensive techniques slows down and growth in skill-intensive techniques
rises even faster. The South on other hand specializes in unskilled-intensive production,
which then lowers the rewards to skill accumulation in the South.
Figures 11 and 12 compare fertility and education rates between the two regions. Due
to the diﬀusion of applied technologies, both regions experience rising fertility rates and
stagnant education rates early on. However, as trade opens up, the South begins to specialize
in unskilled-intensive production, and the North in skilled-intensive production, and the skill
premia move accordingly. The North now experiences an even more pronounced demographic
transition than in the closed case, and the South no demographic transition at all. As is
apparent from Figure 13, all of this happens because the Southern skill premium does not
rise signiﬁcantly as it does in the North. We know from the closed case that if Northern
technology diﬀusion were the only shock to the South, the skill premium would rise. But
in the open case there is an important oﬀsetting inﬂuence on Southern factor prices, arising
from the Stolper-Samuelson eﬀect and our assumptions about relative endowments. That is,
openness exacerbates fertility divergence. It also exacerbates education divergence. Southern
education remains stagnant nearly through the entire simulation, rising only slightly at the
end.
Diﬀerences between the North and South are further illustrated in Figure 14. The transi-
tion to modern economic growth dramatically widens the gap in incomes per worker, unlike
in the closed economy case. This is due to two factors. First, skilled-intensive technologies
which diﬀuse to the South augment a relatively smaller skilled labor force. Second, the
South’s specialization in unskilled-labor-intensive production limits the decline in fertility
and thus keeps per worker output relatively small. Thus, while both regions experience
static gains from trade, the North enjoys a large dynamic advantage not available to the
South.
4 Conclusion
We believe that by explicitly modeling research and development, thus endogenizing the
direction of technical change, we have been able to shed some valuable light on the transition
to modern economic growth. Like most uniﬁed growth models, our model is subject to
the criticism that it makes a take-oﬀ “inevitable,” a proposition to which many historians,
more comfortable with notions of chance and contingency, might object. Our model makes
28another claim, however, which seems much more robust: if a take-oﬀ took place, it should,
inevitably, have ﬁrst involved unskilled-labor-using technologies, for the simple reason that
unskilled labor was the abundant factor of production at this time.
From this simple prediction, as we have seen, ﬂow a whole series of consequences. The
Industrial Revolution should have seen skill premia fall, which they did. It should therefore
have seen an initial increase in fertility rates, which again it did. Our model predicts that
these two phenomena would have continued to reinforce each other indeﬁnitely, barring some
countervailing force. One such force was the continuing growth in Baconian knowledge, which
would eventually lead to the growth of the science-based and skill-intensive sectors of the
Second Industrial Revolution where, we conjecture, such knowledge was ultimately more
stimulative of innovation. A second such force was international trade, which by familiar
Heckscher-Ohlin logic should have seen Europe exporting relatively skill-intensive goods to
the periphery. Both forces should have caused skill premia to stop falling, and start rising,
and this in turn should have prompted a demographic transition.
Our simulations indicate that our model does a pretty good job of explaining the facts
until the late nineteenth century, when European skill premia started falling again, at a
time when according to our model they should have been rising sharply. We explain this
fact in the same way that Galor and Mountford (2004) do: at precisely this time European
and North American governments embarked on a massive programme of public education,
thus exogenously raising skill endowments and lowering skill premia. Furthermore, public
primary education programmes were later followed by two world wars, rising union strength,
and public secondary and tertiary education programmes, all of which served to further
reduce skill premia, in the U.S. case at least through the “Great Compression” of the 1940s
(Goldin and Margo 1992; Goldin and Katz 1999, 2007). In the context of this paper, it
seems that these exogenous factors leading to greater equality were all the time having to
contend with powerful endogenous technological factors leading to greater inequality. Indeed,
as Acemoglu (1998) points out, in the context of a model like this one long run exogenous
increases in skill endowments lead to more rapid skill-biased technical change, thus increasing
the upward pressure on skill premia in the long run. What is remarkable, therefore, is that
western labor markets remained on an egalitarian path until well into the twentieth century.
In this context, current inegalitarian trends in the U.S. and elsewhere can be seen as late
nineteenth century chickens ﬁnally coming home to roost.
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33A Autarky Equilibria
When there is no trade between regions, each region’s equilibrium is solved separately. To determine
sectoral employment, the value of the marginal product of each type of labor is equalized. This
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An added complication arises for the South, since its technological coeﬃcients depend on North-
ern developments. Consider a sector where innovation occurs. Northern machines are then mo-
nopolistically produced next period and their demand is given by equation (21). We may then
plug that expression into equation (13), and exploit the quality symmetry to explicitly solve for
Northern quality indices:
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for k ∈ {l,h}. This solution obtains in every period where Northern innovation occurs.
Next, Qs
k for each time period is solved using equation (37), where in the ﬁrst period of simula-
tion some initial level of the Southern quality index is speciﬁed. Note that Southern machines are
all competitively produced at all times, as these blueprint-spillovers are assumed to be open access
for everyone in the South after one period, allowing for the fraction of blueprints that actually
“arrive” from the North—as it were—as a result of the slow diﬀusion process.
Consequently, the demand for Southern unskilled-labor augmenting machines (with an analo-









Finally, we can plug these expressions for the demand for Southern machines into equation (13)


























2 is then characterized by equation (14).
Thus, to summarize, for the Northern autarkic equilibrium we simultaneous solve for each time











3 . For the Southern autarkic equilibrium we simultaneous solve for each time period equations














34B Partial Trade Equilibrium
With trade of goods x1 and x3 between the North and the South, productions in each region are
given by (38) and (39).
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Equations (47) - (49) are unit cost functions, (50) and (51) are full employment conditions,
(52) - (56) denote regional goods clearance conditions, (57) - (60) equate the marginal products
of raw factors, and (61) and (62) describe the balance of payments for each region. Solving this























3, Z1 and Z3 constitutes the static partial trade equilibrium.
Furthermore, equilibrium levels of Ln
1 and Hn
3 will determine subsequent developments of An
1 and
An
3 from (26) and (27); these in turn will be used to solve the equilibrium for the next time period.
Each region will produce all three goods so long as factors are “similar enough.” If factors of
production suﬃciently diﬀer, the North produces only goods 2 and 3, while the South produces
only goods 1 and 2. No other specialization scenario is possible for the following reasons: ﬁrst,
given that both the North and South have positive levels of L and H, full employment of resources
implies that they cannot specialize completely in good 1 or good 3. Second, specialization solely in
good 2 is not possible either, since a region with a comparative advantage in this good would also
have a comparative advantage in either of the other goods. This implies that each country must
produce at least two goods. Further, in such a scenario we cannot have one region producing goods
1 and 3: with diﬀerent factor prices across regions, a region cannot have a comparative advantage
in the production of both of these goods, regardless of the technological diﬀerences between the two
regions. The simulation only considers the case where all three intermediate goods are produced
by both regions. See Cunat and Maﬀezzoli (2002) for a fuller discussion.
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          Source:  Clark (2007).          Figure 4 
 
The Market for Technologies 
The Closed Economy 
 
 
Parameterizations are as follows:  σ = 3, γ = 0.5, α = 0.5, β = 0.6, δ = 0.95, φl = 2.5, φh = 3.6, λ = 0.695, ρ = 0.1,      
 Γ = 2, k = 0.3, ν = 1.8, θ = 0.5,  emin = 0.3.  These values ensure that Propositions 1 and 2 hold for all t. 
 
Initial conditions are as follows:  A1 =  A2 =  A3 =  B = 1 for both regions; L
N = 2, H
N = 1, L
S = 2, H
S = 0.6. 
 
Because the North is endowed with more unskilled than skilled labor, unskilled-intensive technologies are the first 
to develop.  This induces rising levels of L
N and so speeds up unskilled intensive tech even more.  Now sector 2 also 
grows somewhat – this pulls human capital from sector 3 (which is technologically stagnant) into sector 2, further 
delaying the development of skilled intensive technologies. However, because φl < φh, skill-intensive techniques grow 
around t=11.  Economic growth after this is relatively balanced, with all three sectors moderately growing. 




































Fertility  Rates  (North)      Fertility  Rates  (South) 
 
     
 
 
Initial fertility is normalized to 1, which is replacement fertility.  Fertility above 1 is associated with 
population growth, while fertility below 1 is associated with population shrinkage. 
 
Fertility rises initially for both countries and then falls.  Delays in technological diffusion limit these 
movements in the South.   


























































Education Rate (North)               Education Rate (South) 
 
   
 
In the closed case, skill-intensive technologies do not grow very fast.  As a result, the demographic transition 
is limited; fertility falls only moderately, while education remains at the constrained minimum in both regions 
for most of the simulation, rising only at the tail end.  Thus in the closed case, education fails to play a key 
role in economic growth in either region.  
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             Wrigley and Schofield (1981).  10-year moving average. 
 
Wage Series (North and South) 
 
Although in the simulation wages do rise slowly in the initial stages, we cannot replicate the fall in 
real wages implied by Wrigley and Schofield’s series.     
















Skill-Premia (North and South) 
 
 
While the fall in the skill-premium followed by its rise around the turn of the 19
th century is roughly 
echoed by historical time series, we cannot duplicate the apparent fall in the premium after 1870. Figure 9 
 






Sources:  Harley (1998), Shah Mohammed and Williamson (2004). 
 
 
The Fraction of Export that Arrives as Import 
 
 
Trade costs fall throughout the 19
th century.  In the open case, we illustrate this by having falling 
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The Market for Technologies 




Parameter values are the same as the ones used in Case I, except now a1 and a3 are initially set so that trade 
becomes possible halfway through the simulation. 
 
Again, technology grows first in sector 1; the first part of the simulation replicates the closed case.  But because 
of increasing levels of trade, the demographic reversal is more dramatic in this case, lowering L
N and raising 
H
N, and thus slowing down growth in A1
N and speeding up growth in A3









































Fertility  Rates  (North)      Fertility  Rates  (South) 
    
 
Again, fertility rises initially for both regions.  The North however experiences a more dramatic demographic reversal, 
with falling fertility rates.  The South on the other hand has fertility that is above replication for most of the 
simulation; due to its gradually rising specialization in unskilled-labor intensive production, it does not experience a 
strong decline in fertility. 
 


























































Education Rate (North)               Education Rate (South) 
 
 
While Southern education rates remain stagnant through most of the simulation, Northern education rates rise 
above the minimum constraint and grow significantly thereafter.  Thus here both technologies and education 
are able to grow in the North.  
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Wage Series (North and South) 
 
 
Skill Premia (North and South) 
 
The rise in the Northern skill premium through Heckscher-Ohlin effects produces a more dramatic 
demographic transition in the North.  These same effects limit the transition for the South by anchoring down 
its skill premium. Figure 14 
 
Volume of Traded Goods 
 
North-South Income Gap in Closed and Open Cases 
 
The income per capita gap between the North and South (measured as y
N/ y
S) essentially stem from two 
sources – differences in technologies and differences in trade patterns.  The initial static gains from trade 
actually help slightly reduce the income gap at first.  But the dynamic incentives of such trade hasten the 
Demographic Transition for the North and suppress it in the South, thereby exacerbating the gap.  Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland